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Abstract 
This paper argues that legally speaking, Turkish service recipients must be granted visa-free 
access to the EU. The freedom to provide services is covered by Article 41(1) Additional 
Protocol, and rights in this field should be extended as far as possible to Turkish nationals, 
as outlined in Abatay and others. Article 41(1) AP’s aim is to ensure no new visa restrictions 
can be placed on Turkish nationals. Given that the freedom to receive services is, as stated 
in Luisi and Carbone, a necessary corollary of the freedom to provide services, it is logical 
that this must be extended to service recipients. Furthermore, this paper argues that the 
extensive body of case law and Treaty law between the EU and Turkey demonstrate a 
relationship that is far greater than a simply economic one, as suggested by the CJEU in 
Ziebell, conferring greater rights on Turkish nationals. 
The CJEU, as outlined in Article 19(3) of the TEU, has a purely legal role within the EU legal 
order. It should only rule according to the letter of the law, as opposed to bringing invalid 
considerations into the judgment. In this regard, the Court must rule that Turkish service 
recipients are entitled to visa free travel. The CJEU has, however, borne political reasoning 
in mind in the past, especially with regard to association agreements. Demirkan potentially 
has huge ramifications, with the ‘erosion of sovereignty’ that comes with opening of borders 
to third countries. This would open the door to 75 million Turkish nationals to move freely in 
the EU, and given the recent violent protests in Turkey and the strength of anti-Turkish 
sentiments in the press. This whole issue highlights how the CJEU is often thrust into 
inherently political matters when its sole mandate is to rule on the law of the European 
Union. 
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Introduction 
This paper argues that legally speaking and contrary to the current restrictions, Turkish 
service recipients1 should be granted visa-free travel to EU Member States. In the context of 
EU-Turkey relations, the concept of an individual being a service recipient follows from the 
removal of restriction on the freedom to provide services, first laid out in Article 14 of the 
Ankara Agreement (henceforth ‘AA’.) 
The upcoming Demirkan case,2 currently before the CJEU, forms the central theme of this 
paper. The stated policy of the EU is that “consumers and businesses should be able to use 
the services of providers based in other EU countries without needing prior authorisation or 
facing discriminatory requirements based on the recipient's nationality or place of 
residence.”3 According to treaties between the EU and Turkey, this must be extended to 
Turkish nationals so as to include them under the category of service recipients. The CJEU 
judgment in Luisi and Carbone4 states that service recipients have a right of residence whilst 
the service they are receiving is provided. Were these rights to be extended to Turkish 
nationals, as they legally should be, this would allow Turkish nationals the chance to enjoy 
freedom to provide and receive services, one of the fundamental freedoms of the EU,5 
something that was promised to them over half a century ago. 
1
 The concept of a service recipient is somewhat vague, but under Directive 2006/123/EC OJ L376/36, recital 
36 as: any EU citizen, or non-EU national who benefits from rights conferred to them by EU legislation, 
engaged in a service activity in a Member State and who receives a service that is not marginal or ancillary, has 
a right of residence as long as the service is received. 
2
 Case C-221/11 Leyla Ecem Demirkan v Federal Republic of Germany, forthcoming. 
3
 Europa.eu, Services (May 2011). 
4
 Cases C-286/82 and 26/83, Luisi and Carbone [1984] ECR 377, para. 12, see also Art 1(1)b Directive 
73/148/EEC. 
5
 Article 21(1) Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union [2008] OJ C115/13. 
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It is, however, very difficult to separate this legal issue from politics. Turkey is 
demographically and historically very different to the EU. This has been highlighted by the 
use of lethal force by the Turkish government to the initially peaceful protests in the 
summer of 2013. Such actions only show the width of the divide between the EU and 
Turkey, with Turkey already being accused of being undemocratic.6 The events turn an 
inherently political matter, the lifting of visa restrictions, into an awkward political 
judgment. Whilst many of the decisions the CJEU have made are political in nature, the 
potential opening of the EU’s borders to a country that has used lethal force in response to 
peaceful protests will bring what is intended to be an independent judicial body under 
immense political pressure from Member States.  
 
According to Professor Harry Flam, “the prospect of large-scale immigration from Turkey…is 
a source of considerable concern among the EU-15, where it is feared that the immigrants 
will depress wages, boost unemployment and cause social frictions and political 
upheavals.”7 This fear could be further exacerbated by the instability in Turkey resulting 
from the protests in Istanbul’s Taksim Square. Opening the border to millions of Turks 
increasingly fearful for the stability of their country could result in politically-induced 
migration to the EU on a level never seen before. 
 
                                                          
6
 T Bacınoğlu, The Making of the Turkish Bogeyman: A Unique Case of Misrepresentation in German journalism 
(Graphis Yayınları 1998). 
7
 H Flam, ‘Turkey and the EU’ [2003] Seminar Paper No. 718, Institute for International Economic Studies, 
Stockholm University, p. 10. 
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Regardless of these factors, it appears unjust that Turkey, a country which has waited for 
over half a century for EU citizenship rights, has seen itself overtaken by other candidate 
countries, such as Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia, partly because of the sheer 
size of the potential influx of Turkish nationals.8  
 
The Demirkan case also presents the opportunity for the EU to take away even more border 
control from Member States, in itself a controversial issue. Indeed, Member States have 
unwillingly relinquished some control in this field to the EU, which many feel erodes their 
sovereignty.9 Opening EU borders to a country that has had three military coups in the last 
sixty years, and which, given recent events in the region, could be on the verge of a fourth, 
would be exceedingly unpopular and destabilising. 
 
Turkey has long sought greater engagement with the EU: it was one of the founding 
members of the Council of Europe10 and applied for associate membership of the European 
Economic Community as early as 1959.11 A number of pieces of EU legislation have come 
into force seeking to enable the accession of Turkey into the EU, which was first mentioned 
in 1963 in the preamble to the AA, which granted Turkey the associate EEC membership it 
                                                          
8
 Ibid, p. 17: Flam predicts that by 2030, if given free movement rights, there would be over 3.5 million Turks in 
Germany, compared to 2.2 million in 2000. 
9
 See Article 3(1)j TFEU on the AFSJ, a shared competence, also V Guiraudon and G Lahav ‘A Reappraisal of the 
State Sovereignty Debate: The Case of Migration Control’ [2000] 33(2) Comparative Political Studies 163. 
10
 Council of Europe, ‘Turkey’ (Council of Europe) <http://hub.coe.int/web/coe-
portal/country/turkey?dynLink=true&layoutId=171&dlgroupId=10226&fromArticleId=> accessed 25 April 
2013. 
11
 Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Turkey EU Relations’ <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey-
and-the-european-union.en.mfa> accessed 25 April 2013. 
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sought. The Additional Protocol12 thereto (henceforth ‘AP’) in 1970 and Decision 1/8013 that 
followed sought to fill the gaps in the framework laid down by the Ankara Agreement. 
Overall, one could consider that Turkey has been very harshly treated vis à vis its accession 
to the EU. This is perhaps most evident with regard to the rights its citizens enjoy in the EU, 
which remain mired in the past, including the fact that Turkey has not even been offered 
short-term visa-free travel within Schengen.14  
Turkish citizens appear no closer to gaining the full range of rights enjoyed by European 
Union citizens, or even the rights conferred upon them by the Ankara Agreement:15 for 
example, the envisaged internal market remains unrealised.16 The existing arrangements are 
only partially secured by Article 41(1) AP, the standstill clause,17  and as a result of the 
judgment in Soysal,18which ruled that no new restrictions can be placed on service 
providers. Given that under Luisi and Carbone, service recipients are seen as a necessary 
corollary to service providers, there is no way that Turkish service recipients can have new 
visa restrictions placed upon them. 
12
 Additional Protocol and Financial Protocol signed on 23 November 1970, annexed to the Agreement 
establishing the Association between the European Economic Community and Turkey and on measures to be 
taken for their entry into force [1970] OJ L293/4. 
13
 Decision 1/80 of the Association Council of 19 September 1980 on the development of the association. 
14
 A Stiglmayer, ‘Visa-Free Travel for Turkey: In Everybody’s Interest’ [2011] 11(1) Turkish Policy Quarterly 99: 
100. 
15
 N. Tezcan-Idriz, and P.J. Slot, ‘Free Movement of persons between Turkey and the EU: the Hidden Potential 
of Article 41(1) of the AP’, [2010] CLEER Working Papers 2010(2). 
16
 Article 2 Ankara Agreement [1963] OJ L361/1 . 
17
 Additional Protocol [1970] OJ L293/4. 
18
 Case C-228/06, Soysal and Savatli v Bundesrepublik Deutschland [2009] ECR I-1031, para. 62. 
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This paper will initially consider the relationship between Turkish citizens and the EU by 
looking at the general scheme of EU provisions on the freedom to receive services conferred 
by the AA and the follow-up pieces of legislation. 
Given the significant delay in the CJEU Demirkan judgment,19 the paper can only review the 
facts of the case, and the Opinion of the Advocate-General Cruz Villalon, before offering a 
critical commentary on the Opinion of Advocate General.  It is expected that this will show 
through analysis of the current position of EU law, that legally speaking, the CJEU must rule 
that Turkish service recipients are covered by economic EU free movement rights. 
As a result, no new visa restrictions can be placed upon Turkish nationals, as has been the 
situation in Germany. If the CJEU rules against the applicant, this paper argues EU law will 
have been driven by political factors, including a fear of an influx of Turkish nationals and 
the ongoing violence in the Middle East, which will be considered in the fifth chapter. 
19
 Stiglmayer, Supra, no. 14, p. 107: despite the case being lodged in May 2011 and the hearing taking place in 
November 2012, the judgment, which was expected in late 2012 or early 2013, had still not been published by 
June 2013. 
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Chapter One: EU – Turkey Relationship 
This chapter will look at the subject matter of the law constituting the association between 
the EU and Turkey. It will continue to show the fact that a clear legal framework exists 
conferring a number of rights that can be invoked by Turkish nationals. 
1.1 Association Agreements 
Association Agreements and their provisions “form an integral part of community law,”20 
and produce “direct effects through the community,”21 and as such are “capable of 
conferring upon individual traders rights,”22 so long as the provisions themselves satisfy the 
criteria required by European Union law as a whole, as laid out in van Gend en Loos:23 that 
they are sufficiently clear, precise and unconditional. On top of being capable of having 
direct effect, as laid out in Bresciani,24 association agreements “must also necessarily bear 
all the characteristics of Community law, including that of its primacy.”25 As such, individuals 
can rely on rights conferred by Association Agreements, including when they conflict with 
incompatible national legislation. This must be seen as the case in Demirkan, whereby the 
framework of EU-Turkey law confers justiciable free movement rights upon Turkish 
nationals, despite the contrasting German law. 
20
 Case 181/73 R. V. Haegeman v Belgium [1974] ECR 449, para. 5. 
21
 Case 104/81 Hauptzollamt Mainz v C.A. Kupferberg & Cie KG a.A. [1982] ECR 3641, para. 26. 
22
 Ibid, para. 27. 
23
 Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos v Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen [1963] ECR 1. 
24
 Case 87/75, [1976] ECR 129, para. 23. 
25
 Philipp Gasparon, ‘The Transposition of the Principle of Member State Liability into the Context of External 
Relations [1999] 10 EJIL 605, p. 607. 
11 
The current Article 217 TFEU provides the legal basis for association agreements, which 
have the aim of “facilitating and strengthening the gradual economic and political 
integration,”26 with third countries, often with a view to accession. The Article itself is 
flexible so as to permit a range of different types of agreements. The case of Haegeman27 
brought Association Agreements within the scope of Union judicial law: factually, a case 
concerning the EEC – Greece Association Agreement of 1961, and more specifically charges 
levied on Greek wine. The CJEU stated that, as laid out in Article 177 EEC Treaty,28 it shall 
have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings concerning the interpretation of acts of the 
institutions of the Community. Given that the agreement in question was concluded by the 
Council, it constituted an act of one of the institutions of the Community within the scope of 
the aforementioned Treaty article.29 When an agreement is mixed,30 association 
agreements still come within the scope of this notion and therefore the CJEU can still give 
preliminary rulings. 
1.2 Historical Background 
The legal provisions in the EU-Turkey relationship are, according to Phinnemore,31 the most 
far reaching out of any association agreement concluded by the with a third country.32 Not 
26
 C Rault, R Sova and AM Sova, ‘The Role of Association Agreements within European Union Enlargements to 
Central and Eastern European Counties’ [2007] Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit, Discussion Paper No. 
2769, April 2007, p. 3. 
27 Haegeman, Supra, no. 20, para. 5. 
28
 Article 267 TFEU after the Lisbon re-numbering. 
29
 Haegeman, Supra, no. 20, paras. 2-4. 
30
 The subject matter of the agreement is shared between the EU and Member States under Articles 2-5 TFEU, 
so the EU is unable to conclude the agreement without the authority of Member States. 
31
 D Phinnemore, Association: Stepping Stone or Alternative to EU Membership? (Sheffield Academic Press 
1999) p. 17. 
32
 The Athens Agreement with Greece was conducted on similar terms, but Greece has since joined the EU and 
as such is subject to EU law. 
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only does it refer to the specific goal of accession, as laid out in the preamble of the AA, it 
has a much broader scope and aim than agreements with Cyprus or Malta, or even the 
Europe Agreements.33 This section will outline the road to the current legal position: one 
with specific goals and aims as well as numerous directly effective provisions, with a broader 
scope than simply economic benefits. These will be explored in the following chapter. 
However, the relationship has been shaped, as postulated in the introduction, by many non-
legal events which have unfortunately altered the route of association, meaning Turkish 
citizens cannot enjoy many of the rights they should enjoy. This is partly due to a number of 
other historical reasons outlined in the fifth chapter. 
On the 31st of July 1959, the Turkish government applied for negotiations to enter into an 
association agreement with the then EEC.34 After four years of negotiations, the Ankara 
Agreement was then signed and ratified by all six Member States and a decision enacted by 
the Council, entering into force in 1964. One could consider that the AA itself is more of an 
outline which was intended to be built upon at a later date by the Association Council, 
which is able to make binding decisions having direct effect.35  
The aims of the AA are clearly laid out in Article 2 AA, whereby in paragraph 1 it states: “the 
aim of this Agreement is to promote the continuous and balanced strengthening of trade 
33
 Phinnemore, Supra, no. 31, p. 18. 
34
 E Lenski, Turkey and the EU: On the Road to Nowhere? [2003] 63 ZaöRV 77. 
35
 Article 22 Ankara Agreement: most famously Decision 1/80. 
13 
and economic relations between the Parties.” 36  This is to be achieved by “continuous 
improvement in living conditions in Turkey through accelerated economic progress and the 
harmonious expansion of trade...to reduce the disparity between the Turkish economy and 
the economies of the Member States.”37 Buzan and Diez postulate the rationale behind 
offering associate membership was to “improve Turkey’s economic performance and living 
standards,”38 re-asserted by the latter part of Article 2(1). 
Article 2(2) AA puts Article 2(1) into context: that a customs union shall be progressively 
established, consisting of three stages: a preparatory stage,39 a transitional stage40 and a 
final stage.41 In Article 28 AA, the door was left open for Turkish accession to the 
Community, permitting Contracting Parties to examine the possibility of the accession of 
Turkey to the Community once it had advanced far enough to be capable of satisfying its 
obligations. As mentioned above, this shows the openness and broad scope of the 
association agreement in terms of future potential to accede: something which has not 
been done since and which must be seen as highlighting the special relationship between 
Turkey and the EU. 
36
 Article 2(1) Ankara Agreement. 
37
 Recital 4, Ankara Agreement. 
38
 B Buzan and T Diez, ‘The European Union and Turkey’ [1999] 41(1) Survival 41, p.42. 
39
 Article 2(3)a and 3 Ankara Agreement. 
40
 Article 2(3)b, 4 and Title II Ankara Agreement. 
41
 Article 2(3)c and 5 Ankara Agreement. 
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The preparatory stage, intended to last five years,42 sought to allow Turkey to strengthen its 
economy, funded through a scheme of aid by EEC States, so as to enable it to fulfil the 
obligations bestowed upon it in the latter two stages.43 Turkey initiated negotiations to 
enter into the transitional stage in 1968. Lenski purports this was due to the Turkish desire 
to abolish the planned economy and foster economic development through European trade, 
and additionally as the development of external trade with the Community had not grown 
as quickly as expected.44  
The Additional Protocol, signed in 1970, entered into force on 1 January 1973. It lays“down 
the conditions, arrangements and timetables for implementing the transitional stage 
referred to in Article 4 of the Agreement establishing an Association between the European 
Economic Community and Turkey.”45 To this end, it lays down ambitious goals concerning 
the freedom of service rights that Turkish citizens were to enjoy46 within the EU and the 
start of the customs union47 that was to be established. The economic policies of both 
parties were also to be aligned.48 Again, this shows the intent on both sides to enjoy a wide 
range of reciprocal rights, admittedly economic in this case, based on an equal relationship. 
42
 Article 3(2) Ankara Agreement. 
43
 Article 3(1) Ankara Agreement. 
44
 Lenski, Supra, no. 34, p. 79. 
45
 Article 1, Additional Protocol. 
46
 Title II AP: movement of persons and services, also Chapter 3 AA. 
47
 Chapter I Additional Protocol. 
48
 Title III AP. 
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Article 4(2) AA, and more specifically, Article 61 AP both lay out that “without prejudice to 
the special provisions of this Protocol, the transitional stage shall be twelve years.” 
Pertaining to workers and services, the provisions laid out in Title III AP state that freedom 
of movement of workers between Turkey and the EU shall be secured by the end of 1986.49 
However, for a number of reasons, this was never realised. In the 1970s, Turkey perhaps 
experienced its worst economic crisis since the fall of the Ottoman Empire, suffering a 
balance of payments crisis and only bringing inflation down from three-digit levels in 1980.50 
Turkey’s occupation of North Cyprus, coupled with its human rights record attracted a great 
deal of attention as well, and between 1976 and 1980 the association stood still.51 A military 
coup in 1980 by a pro-EU junta led to the implementation of Decision 1/80. The CJEU 
describes Decision 1/80 as well as Decision 2/76 as being “adopted by the Council of 
Association in order to implement Article 12 of the Agreement and Article 36 of the 
Additional Protocol which, in its judgment in Demirel,52 the Court recognized as being 
intended essentially to set out a programme,”53 and implement the rights laid out in those 
provisions. This was to ensure that the rights laid out were justiciable, as they had not been 
found to be in Demirel, because the rights on which the applicant sought to rely were not 
specific enough. 
49
 Article 36 AP. 
50
 Y Akyüz and K Boratav, ‘The Making of the Turkish Financial Crisis’ 31(9) World Development 1549, p. 1551. 
51
 E. Esen, Die Beziehungen zwischen der Türkei und der EG unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der 
innertürkischen Auseinandersetzungen um die Assoziation 1973-1980 (Centaurus 1990), p. 223. 
52
 Case 12/86, Meryem Demirel v Stadt Schwäbisch Gmund [1987] ECR 3719. 
53
 Case C-192/89 S.Z. Sevinçe v Staatssecretaris van Justitie [1990] ECR I-3461, para. 21. 
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Despite this, from 1981 until 1983 the implementation of the Association was suspended 
due to human rights abuses and the lack of re-democratisation arising from the junta.54 The 
long term effect of this meant there was “no schedule agreed to move from the transitional 
to the final stage, no customs union [and] no free movement of workers.”55 To this end, the 
EU sought to use financial instruments to exert more pressure on Turkey’s restoration of 
parliamentary democracy, 56 which resulted in the return of civil government in 1983. At this 
point, Arikan purports that Turkey realised that it had to take the EU’s human rights 
criticism seriously and that it needed the EU for both political and economic reasons.57 
Turkey’s current membership application dates from 1987: Tatham posits that “the 
Community’s enthusiasm for Turkish membership was perhaps evidenced by the more than 
two and a half years it took the Commission to prepare its Opinion,”58 on the matter, which 
was answered in the negative. Only in 1999 at the Helsinki European Council was Turkey 
officially accepted as a candidate country status and in 2002, the Copenhagen European 
Council proposed to enter into negotiations with Turkey once it had fulfilled the 
Copenhagen criteria for accession states.59  
54 Lenski, Supra, no. 34, p. 79, see also [1981] Bulletin of the EC No. 12, pt.2.2.45 (Decision 1/83 of the 
Association Council, [1983] OJ L112/2). 
55
 A Tatham, Enlargement of the European Union (Kluwer Law 2009), p.144. 
56
 H Arikan, Turkey and the EU: An Awkward Candidate for EU Membership? (Ashgate 2006). 
57
 Ibid, p. 128. 
58
 Tatham, Supra, no. 55, p. 144. 
59
 European Council Presidency Conclusions, 12 and 13 December 2002. Brussels, 29 January. 
<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/73842.pdf> accessed 26 April 
2013. 
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Nevertheless, despite this Turkey has seen the rights promised to it by the EEC a half-
century ago remain unfulfilled, with numerous countries overtaking it in the applications 
process and being granted full EU citizenship rights. Furthermore, many Europeans fear 
Turkish membership would spark an influx of millions of Turkish migrants into Europe, a 
major reason why the European public is sceptical about Turkey's accession to the EU, if 
they were granted full citizenship rights.60  
1.3 The development of Turkish citizens’ rights within the framework of EU-Turkey law 
Both the AA and AP constitute primary law, with the Decisions of the Association Council 
and of the CJEU constituting secondary law. As posited in earlier in this chapter, the legal 
basis for the AA is Article 217 TFEU, and as with all association agreements concluded under 
this Article, it forms an integral part of Union law, as outlined by Haegeman.61 Furthermore, 
Yalinçak states that “since the AA is an international treaty, it has supremacy over secondary 
EU legislation.”62 The AA has not been found to be directly effective itself, but as discussed 
below, numerous provisions through CJEU case-law have been found to be.63 One of these 
provisions, Article 41(1) AP, the standstill clause, is the provision relied upon by the 
applicant in Demirkan. The following section will detail how this provision, amongst others, 
has direct effect through a consistent body of CJEU case-law. 
60
 Hürriyet, ‘Verheugen tries to ease concerns over Turkish influx into the EU’ Hürriyet (Ankara, 8 February 
2005) <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=verheugen-tries-to-ease-concerns-
over-turkish-influx-into-eu-2005-08-02> accessed 27 April 2013, see also K Archick, ‘European Union 
Enlargement’ (Congressional Research Service, 4 February  2012) 
<http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS21344.pdf> accessed 27 April 2013. 
61
 Haegeman, Supra, no. 20, para. 5. 
62
Orhun Hakan  Yalincak, Freedom of Movement Rights of Turkish Nationals in the European Union,
[2013] 19(3) Columbia Journal of European Law 391-422, p. 5.
63
 Nicola Rogers, A Practitioners’ Guide to the EC-Turkey Association Agreement (Springer 1999), p. 8-9. 
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The first landmark case to come before the CJEU concerning the AA was Demirel.64 The 
Court initially referenced paragraph 5 of Haegeman, re-affirming that association 
agreements are acts of institutions and as such are indeed subject to CJEU jurisdiction. Mrs. 
Demirel, a Turkish national, came to visit her husband, a worker in Germany, on a tourist 
visa,65 in order to join him there.66 She remained in the country after the expiry of her 
tourist visa, and was therefore threatened with expulsion by the German authorities. 
Demirel sought to rely on provisions (namely Article 12 AA and Article 36 AP) of EU-Turkey 
law. 
Firstly, Advocate General Darmon outlined that the agreement aimed to establish ever 
closer bonds between the Turkish people and the peoples brought together in the EEC, and 
outlined the prospect of accession, which in his eyes sufficed for the agreement to be seen 
as an act under Article 267 TFEU, and therefore eligible for preliminary rulings.67 The CJEU 
stated that an agreement such as the AA and AP could be directly effective,68 but that the 
provisions on which Mrs. Demirel sought to rely, Article 12 AA and Article 36 AP, were not 
sufficiently clear, precise and unconditional to be directly effective,69 as mentioned 
previously. 
64
 Demirel, Supra, no. 52. 
65
 P Eeckhout, EU External Relations Law (OUP 2011), p. 125. 
66
 Paragraph 3 of Demirel outlines that Mrs. Demirel should have been eligible to have joined him for the 
purposes of family reunification, but the Land in which Mr. Demirel was resident, Baden-Württemberg, had 
changed its rules, and he did not satisfy the criteria of having resided there for 8 years, leading to the court 
proceedings in hand. 
67
 Opinion of Advocate General Darmon in Demirel [1987] ECR 3737, para. 14. 
68
 See Case 181/73 Haegeman (supra, no. 20) and 87/75 Bresciani (supra, no. 24). 
69
 Demirel, Supra, no. 52, para. 23. 
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Perhaps the watershed moment in this field came in Sevinçe,70 turning theoretical, non-
justiciable rights, described by Jeremy Bentham as “nonsense upon stilts,”71 into rights that 
could be enjoyed by Turkish citizens. The applicant, Mr. Sevinçe, a Turkish national who had 
been part of the Dutch labour force for a number of years, appealed a rejection of the 
renewal of his residence permit in the Netherlands. He sought to rely on Article 2(1)b 
Decision 1/7672 and Article 6(1) of Decision 1/80.73 Whilst not constituting primary law as 
the AA and AP are deemed to be, the CJEU determined that they fall within the scope of the 
current Article 267 TFEU, as they were directly connected to the AA and AP and thus form 
an integral part of the Community legal system.74 
The Court determined that the provisions on which Mr. Sevinçe sought to rely “uphold, in 
clear, precise and unconditional terms, the right of a Turkish worker, after a number of 
years' legal employment in a Member State, to enjoy free access to any paid employment of 
his choice.”75 The Court further stated that despite the provisions in Article 2(2) Decision 
1/76 and Article 6(3) Decision 1/80 stating that the provisions on which Mr. Sevinçe sought 
to rely were subject to national rules, this did not affect their ability to have direct effect as 
they simply applied to administrative measures, “without empowering the Member States 
70
 Sevinçe, Supra, no. 53. 
71
 J Bentham, Rights, Representation and Reform – Nonsense upon Stilts and other writings on the French 
Revolution eds F Rosen and P Scholfield (Clarendon Press 2002) P Schofield,  ‘Jeremy Bentham’s ‘Nonsense 
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to make conditional or restrict the application of the precise and unconditional right which 
the decisions of the Council of Association grant to Turkish workers.”76  
The Court further stated that Article 6(1) Decision 1/80 must be interpreted narrowly and 
strictly,77 but where a Turkish national carries out work that is more than merely marginal or 
ancillary,78 and is thus considered a member of the labour force, as required by Article 6(1) 
Decision 1/80, applications for residence permits by Turkish nationals cannot be refused.79 
Additionally, any Turkish worker who has been resident legally80 and pursued a genuine 
economic activity81 for at least one year with the same employer, and the same employer 
wishes to continue the employment, as required by Article 6(1) Decision 1/80, regardless of 
how they entered the country, they may rely on the rights conferred by Decision 1/80.82 
The CJEU has determined that discrimination against Turks when in the EU in a number of 
fields is prohibited through direct effect of provisions of the association agreement, 
including remuneration and other conditions of work,83 educational grants84 and 
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healthcare.85 Furthermore, Dörr and Ünal highlights that provisions of EU law should be 
applied as far as possible to Turkish citizens, both procedurally and substantively.86 Finally, 
as suggested above, given the fact that many of the goals of the initial AA remain unfulfilled, 
it could be considered that Article 41(1) AP acts as a shield, ensuring that no new 
restrictions can be placed upon the freedom of establishment and services, as upheld by the 
CJEU in Savas,87 Tum and Dari88 and Soysal,89 which will be discussed in more detail in the 
following chapter. 
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Chapter Two: Services 
2.1 Services in the EU 
Article 26(2) TFEU outlines that “the internal market shall comprise an area without internal 
frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured in 
accordance with the provisions of the Treaties.” More specifically, Article 56 TFEU is the 
central provision governing services, prohibiting restrictions placed upon them “in respect 
of nationals who are established in a Member State other than that of the person for whom 
services are intended.” Freedom to provide services “entails the carrying out of an economic 
activity for a temporary period in a Member State where either the provider or recipient is 
not established.”90  
The Insurance Services91 case suggests that if a person or undertaking has a permanent 
economic base in a Member State, regardless of whether it is simply an office, it cannot 
avail itself of the freedom to provide services, but instead falls under the scope of freedom 
of establishment. Nevertheless, where one must avail themselves of certain infrastructure, 
such as an office92 to be able to provide services, this does not necessarily render them 
outside the scope of Article 56 TFEU. Furthermore, the CJEU has held that the fact that the 
90
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service is provided over a period of years does not mean Article 56 TFEU is inapplicable.93 To 
this end, in van Binsbergen,94the CJEU determined that Article 56 TFEU has direct effect. 
Services themselves are defined broadly, although as with the other freedoms, they require 
a cross-border element,95 and shall only be considered services where they are normally 
provided for remuneration.96 They do not cease to be a service if the provider is a non-profit 
undertaking,97 or if, as in Schindler98 if there is an element of chance involved in the 
potential return. Indeed, “remuneration need not be money, as long as it can be valued in 
money: food and drink has been found by the Court to be remuneration in the context of 
employment,99 and there is no reason it should take a different stance”100 on service 
recipients. 
Article 1(1) Directive 64/221/EEC101 includes service recipients within the scope of services, 
and Article 1(1)b Directive 73/148/EEC102 expands upon this by granting service recipients 
right of residence for the duration over which the services are provided, including to 
dependents under 21103 and the spouse.104 With regards to case law, and as outlined in the 
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introduction, the CJEU initially found in Watson and Belmann105 that despite the fact that 
Articles 56 and 57 TFEU do not expressly mention service recipients, the Treaty does indeed 
cover the passive freedom to provide services as a necessary corollary for freedom of the 
provider.106 To this end, restrictions placed on service recipients under the scheme of the 
Title IV, Chapter III are unlawful, as confirmed in Luisi and Carbone.107 
Article 56 TFEU imposes somewhat of an unfortunate caveat insofar as the persons seeking 
to provide services must already have a place of establishment within the EU and 
furthermore, if a natural person, must possess the nationality of a Member State.108 In the 
Scorpio Konzertproduktionen case, the CJEU stated that the “EEC Treaty does not extend the 
benefit of those provisions to providers of services who are nationals of non-member 
countries, even if they are established within the Community and an intra-Community 
provision of services is concerned.”109 
Broadly speaking, the assumption that non-EU nationals do not enjoy such rights is 
contested by Carrera and Wiesbrock. They purport that following a string of landmark cases 
in non-discrimination, such as Metock,110 Soysal,111 Genç,112 Commission v Netherlands,113 
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El-Yousfi114 and Chakroun115 that third-country nationals do indeed enjoy a range of rights, 
including equality in some regards, and that these judgments challenge the ‘untouched 
nationalistic gardens’ EU Member States retain on citizenship rights.116 
More specifically, services can be considered to fall within the four freedoms of the EU, 
given their economic nature. Provisions thus relating to both the active and passive freedom 
to provide services in EU law must therefore be considered to also apply to Turkish 
nationals, bearing in mind Article 14 AA, as well as the right to non-discrimination. This 
should be considered to exist even bearing in mind the narrow reading of the EU-Turkish 
relationship the CJEU came to in Ziebell.117 From the scheme of law as laid out in this 
section, it seems inconceivable that under the standstill clause a Turkish national should be 
rendered unable to enjoy the passive freedom to provide services. 
2.2 Services in respect of the EU-Turkey relationship 
The freedom to provide services is, to some extent, tied up with the free movement of 
workers provision within the AA.118 Article 14 AA states that “the Contracting Parties agree 
to be guided by [Articles 56, 57 and 59-62 TFEU] for the purpose of abolishing restrictions on 
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freedom to provide services between them.” However, one could by analogy suggest that 
this article does not have direct effect given the decision in Demirel119 stating that the 
materially identical Article 12 AA did not have direct effect, as it did not satisfy the van Gend 
en Loos criteria. 
The AP does not specifically refer to services. It only provides a ‘standstill clause,’120 
prohibiting new restrictions, concerning which Article 41(2) AP gives the Association Council 
the power to determine a timetable and the actual shaping of the free movement rights in 
this field.121 Article 41(1) AP has direct effect, as confirmed by Savas122 and Abatay and 
others, 123 so as to preclude Member States from implementing new restrictions on service 
providers and those seeking to establish themselves in a Member State. This provision is 
also echoed in the materially identical Article 13 of Decision 1/80 on the freedom of 
establishment. The ‘standstill’ clause prohibits the application of conditions for access to 
territory of a Member that are less favourable than the conditions that were applicable on 
the date of entry into force of the Additional Protocol, namely 1 January 1973.124 
Idriz notes that standstill clauses in themselves are not exclusive to external relations, but 
have played an important role in a Community context as well. Not only have they been 
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used for transitional arrangements, but in one of the seminal CJEU judgments, van Gend en 
Loos, concerned Article 12 EEC, a customs standstill clause. Article 12 EEC had a very similar 
nature and purpose to Article 41(1) AP.125 
The case of Tum and Dari126 concerned two Turkish nationals who had been refused entry 
by the Home Secretary to enter UK territory for the purpose of establishing themselves in 
business on their own account and were ordered to leave the UK, to which they had only 
been admitted on a temporary basis.127 The appellants submitted that the standstill clause 
would be rendered meaningless and redundant if Member States could effectively whittle it 
away and make it harder, or even impossible, for Turkish nationals to enter their territory.128 
The CJEU held that “Turkish nationals may rely on Article 41(1) AP to invoke the preclusion 
of any restrictions, such as visas, on the exercise of that freedom, including those governing 
the conditions relating to the first admission to that MS,”129 and that once admitted, they 
enjoy the same rights as EU nationals.130 
Soysal131 concerned two Turkish nationals who worked as lorry drivers for a Turkish 
company, driving lorries registered to a German company. They were refused visas to enter 
125
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Germany despite the fact that when the standstill clause came into force, Germany had no 
visa requirements for Turkish service providers.132  
The CJEU determined the primacy of the AA and AP over secondary law: the conflicting 
German national law, the Aufenthaltsgesetz, implemented Regulation 539/2001.133 As such, 
it could not challenge the fact that the visa restriction presented a ‘new restriction,’ 
prohibited by Article 41(1) AP. This could not be called into question by the fact that the 
German legislation merely implemented Union legislation.134 The Court thus concluded that 
Article 41(1) AP precluded the introduction of new visa requirements of service providers 
from Turkey. 
As purported above, and through cases like Luisi and Carbone, Article 56 TFEU includes the 
right to receive services as well as provide them: 
“one would expect that the same scope would apply concerning Turkish service 
recipients as well, especially since the Court already ruled that the principles 
enshrined in ‘the provisions of the Treaty relating to freedom to provide services, 
must be extended, so far as possible, to Turkish nationals to eliminate restrictions on 
the freedom to provide services between the contracting parties.’”135 
132
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The following chapter will outline the focus of this paper, the Demirkan judgment, looking at 
its facts, the Opinion of the Advocate General and will provide a detailed commentary and 
analysis thereof. 
30 
Chapter Three: Facts and Advocate-General’s Opinion in the Demirkan case 
3.1 Facts of the Demirkan case 
Miss Demirkan, the applicant in the proceedings, is a Turkish national born in 1993. In 2007, 
together with her mother, they applied for a grant of a Schengen visa to visit her stepfather, 
a German national, in Germany. The application for a visa was rejected. The applicant and 
her mother appealed this decision before the Verwaltungsgericht Berlin, seeking a 
declaration that they were entitled to enter Germany without a visa, or requiring that they 
be granted one. The applicant argues that in light of Article 41(1) AP, Turkish nationals who 
are service recipients may rely on the law in force at the time the AP entered into effect, 
which was that Turkish nationals neither seeking to work nor to stay in Germany for more 
than three months,.136 It should be noted that the applicant’s mother was granted a visa for 
the purposes of family reunification during the initial proceedings, so the applicant pursued 
her case alone from thereon in. 
The Verwaltungsgericht rejected the appeal on the grounds that the standstill clause did not 
apply for the stay for the purposes of visiting, and thus it was unnecessary to examine 
whether the clause extended also to the freedom to receive services, which might only 
suffice if the purpose of entering the country was to receive services. However, the 
Verwaltungsgericht stated the incidental receipt of services in connection with a stay 
effected for the purposes of visiting did not suffice. The applicant then appealed against this 
136
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decision before the Oberverwaltungsgericht Berlin-Brandenburg, which asked for a 
clarification on the following questions: 
(1) Does the passive freedom to provide services fall within the scope of the concept 
of freedom to provide services within the meaning of Article 41(1) of the Additional 
Protocol to the Agreement establishing an Association between the European 
Economic Community and Turkey of 23 November 1970 (Additional Protocol)? 
(2) In the event that the first question is answered in the affirmative: does the 
protection of the passive freedom to provide services under the law on the 
Association Agreement, specifically pursuant to Article 41(1) of the Additional 
Protocol, also extend to Turkish nationals, who – like the claimant – do not wish to 
enter the Federal Republic of Germany in order to receive a specific service, but for 
the purposes of visiting relatives for a stay of up to three months and rely on the mere 
possibility of receiving services in the Federal territory? 
3.2 Opinion of the Advocate General in the Demirkan case 
The Advocate General’s opinion was delivered on 11 April 2013 by Advocate General Cruz 
Villalon. In his opinion, he outlined in paragraph 30 that he did not feel the passive freedom 
to provide services was included within the scope of the standstill clause contained in the 
AP, and, even were it to be covered, a stay of up to three months to visit relatives would not 
fall within the scope of the AP. The following paragraphs will expand on his logic behind this 
opinion, and then the next section will offer a critical commentary on his opinion. 
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The opinion of the Advocate General first starts by providing an overview of the existing 
case-law on the standstill clause. Cruz Villalon firstly states that, as in a number of cases 
referred to in Chapter 2 of this paper, Article 41(1) AP has direct effect,137 but that it does 
not confer by itself a substantive right to reside or provide services.138 He then continues to 
state that it is important there are no new visa restrictions on the freedom to provide 
services, as otherwise they would interfere with the enjoyment of the fundamental freedom 
to provide services, bearing in mind the sizeable administrative and financial burdens 
involved in constantly obtaining time-limited permits.139 
Cruz Villalon then continues to reject Germany, Greece, the UK and the Council’s submission 
that visa requirements do not impair the freedom to provide services, on the grounds of 
cost,140 as well as the lack of legal certainty that a visa will be granted.141 However, he does 
entertain the Council’s view that applying Article 41(1) of the AP to service recipients would 
undermine the common visa policy. Soysal did not resolve all issues relating to the standstill 
clause, especially concerning the passive freedom to provide services, as it concerned the 
active freedom.142 
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The Advocate General then continues to distinguish service recipients and providers, despite 
them appearing the mirror image of one another,143 stating that they differ rather sizeably. 
In this regard, he states that service providers relate to a clearly defined group, who have a 
close link to the protected service, whereas recipients includes service consumers, to which 
potentially everyone belongs: indeed, “almost every day, everyone consumes a multiplicity 
of services without one of them being characteristic for consumers as market 
participants.”144  
Pertaining to the applicability of the passive freedom to receive services, Cruz Villalon seeks 
to invoke the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties to interpret the AP. He continues to 
question what was understood by ‘freedom to provide services’ at the time the AP was 
concluded, as the passive freedom to receive services was not clarified until 1984 in Luisi 
and Carbone. He suggests a number of indicators point to the idea that service recipients 
had been considered as a corollary of service providers, although was highly 
controversial.145 
The Opinion of the Advocate General in this case would appear to, at least to some extent, 
sidestep the legal question at hand. Initially, the Advocate General uses Article 31(1) of the 
Vienna Convention146 to interpret the AP, and in particular and the scope of Article 41(1) AP, 
143
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as it is an international treaty. Whilst useful, it simply lays down the basic rules of Treaty 
interpretation,147 stating that words should be given their ordinary meaning.148  
Cruz Villalon then highlights that Article 14 AA provides that parties need only be guided by 
primary law provisions on the freedom to provide services, which does not necessarily 
require uniformity. However, according to the CJEU in Abatay and others, principles relating 
to the freedom to provide services must be extended as far as possible to Turkish 
nationals.149 This should be interpreted in line with Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties, stating that the possibility of an extension of an agreement to a non-
member country is dependent on the objectives of the agreements.150  
Concerning the second question, Cruz Villalon states that there is no distinction between 
insignificant and significant services received, so long as they constitute effective activities 
that are not merely marginal or ancillary, services received fall within the scope of the 
passive freedom to provide services.151 As he purports, the freedom to receive services 
includes sectors as diverse as tourism,152 medical services,153 private education154 and 
leasing.155 However, he concludes that if the receipt of services on the trip is merely 
147
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marginal that the family visit becomes the only purpose, the possibility to receive 
unspecified services does not suffice to take advantage of the protection afforded by the 
passive freedom to provide services.156 
3.3 Analysis of the Advocate General’s Opinion 
The first part of the Advocate General’s opinion seems to try to diverge from the current 
position of European law rather greatly. He makes a number of distinctions between 
regimes and rights that simply do not exist within the framework of EU law. This leads one 
to wonder whether the decision to submit an opinion ruling against the applicant was made 
first, then the law twisted to fit that argument. 
It is rather difficult to concur with Cruz Villalon’s statement that the Union has different 
goals and a greater level of integration compared EU-Turkish relationship, and as such, the 
rights sought by the applicant should be restricted. Whilst it may make sense to restrict full 
citizenship rights to Union citizens,157 it would appear impossible to try to restrict what are, 
fundamentally, economic rights. The four freedoms are essentially economic in nature, and, 
given that Cruz Villalon outlines the goals of the EU-Turkey relationship as simply 
economic,158 it seems rather peculiar that what are essentially economic rights could be 
restricted on these grounds. 
156
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Cruz-Villalon then embarks on a highly selective reading of legal provisions within the EU-
Turkey arrangement, much like both the Advocate General and CJEU in Ziebell,159 essentially 
considering the EU legal order and the EU-Turkey legal order completely different subject 
matters. This potentially two-tiered system of rights is highly undesirable and difficult to 
foresee as the intention of the draftsmen when creating the current body of EU-Turkish law, 
especially bearing in mind its reciprocal nature. 
As mentioned above, Cruz Villalon continues to create what one might consider an arbitrary 
distinction between the two legal orders based on their objectives. Indeed, it has been 
suggested that whilst he uses the objectives of the Treaties to define the EU legal regime, 
“for the EU-Turkey AA, he bases his findings on the effective use made of the provisions of 
the Agreement.”160 One could consider this to be rather hypocritical in a number of ways, 
not least because there are a number of unfulfilled Treaty goals in EU primary law, as well as 
the fact that the EU-Turkey arrangement lays out a number of goals which remain unfulfilled 
due to a number of non-legal reasons, not least due to the EU’s reluctance to consider 
Turkey’s application with equal haste and interest to other accession countries.161 
Another arbitrary distinction invoked by the Advocate General and one that cannot be 
found elsewhere in European Union law is that between service providers and recipients. It 
is rather difficult to argue with this stance pragmatically speaking, although this could be 
159
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considered to be where the Advocate General’s Opinion starts to veer off from the legal 
position laid out by the AA and AP, and indeed the scheme of European Union law. As in 
Luisi and Carbone,162 the passive freedom to provide service is considered as the necessary 
corollary to the active freedom to provide services, and as such, no distinction to this end 
can really be made. 
As outlined by Article 14 AA, the parties shall be guided by European Union law. Whilst of 
course uniformity is not referred to in the provision and thus cannot be read into the AA 
when interpreting Treaties using Article 31 of the Vienna Convention, the current position 
requires that the freedom to provide services should be extended as far as possible. One 
could suggest that the rights should be extended until either there are insurmountable 
barriers to equality, or until Turkish service providers and recipients enjoy equality with EU 
nationals. This does not give the scope, as one might suggests the Advocate General’s 
opinion suggests, to restrict rights simply because there is no concrete obligation to confer 
all the rights enjoyed by EU nationals upon Turkish nationals. 
With regards to the AA, the CJEU determined in Ziebell,163 its purpose to promote trade and 
economic relations between Turkey and the EU and has exclusively economic purposes. In 
this way, he tries to separate it from the EU legal order. Reading the association in this 
manner, the scheme of EU-Turkey law clearly diverges from the EU legal order, which goes 
far further than merely economic rights and provides a range of social rights, such as 
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citizenship.164 It also plays a role that the AA is immediately applicable given its 
programmatic nature,165 and therefore the Advocate General concludes that the structure 
and context of the AA that the standstill clause was not “intended, in the absence of any 
expression provision, to regulate an area of such sensitivity as the free movement of 
persons so extensively as would be the case were the standstill clause extended to include 
the passive freedom to provide services.”166 
In such a case, given the sidestepping of a number of legal certainties, it is rather difficult to 
shake the notion that, as in Ziebell, the decision was made first as to which way the case was 
to be decided, then the legal arguments selected and adapted to fill in the gaps and create 
an argument to reach a conclusion that was previously reached. Indeed, there are a number 
of similarities between the CJEU’s ‘selective reading’ approach to the Agreement of free 
movement of persons between the EC and Switzerland167 and the AA.168 Indeed, in the 
Grimme case,169 the CJEU read the Agreement between the EC and Switzerland (henceforth 
‘AECS’) very narrowly, considering only a small number of provisions to have effect for legal 
persons, although the arguments appear to pass over a number of elements of the legal 
164
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framework of the Agreement:170 almost, as for the A-G Opinion in Demirkan, that the 
decision was made first on which way the CJEU would rule. 
However, in a later judgment,171 the CJEU used a much more open interpretation of the 
AECS to come to a conclusion more in line with EU law, as opposed to considering such an 
arrangement a wholly different legal entity within its own confines as it had in Grimme. This 
could be considered rather concerning: that the EU and CJEU almost seem to interpret such 
Agreements as they please. 
With regard to the Advocate General stating that unspecified, albeit marginal, services do 
not cross the required threshold to invoke the freedom to provide services, whilst perhaps 
this presents a slightly more logically considered approach, it is still difficult to concur with 
this viewpoint, bearing the scheme of EU law in mind. Of course, it is indeed plausible that 
the unspecified services received on the trip may become so marginal that the only purpose 
is the family visit.172 In such a scenario, the applicant cannot be considered to fall within the 
scope of being a service recipient. However, nowhere in EU law does it require the services 
to be specified, and furthermore, tourism is explicitly covered by Luisi and Carbone.173 
Indeed, to this end, it would appear rather difficult to only consume marginal and ancillary 
services whilst enjoying a trip as a tourist as the applicant appears likely to in the case at 
hand. 
170
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The following section will outline the viewpoint that the CJEU should take, but under the 
letter of the law, must take when deciding this case, as laid out in the first two chapters of 
this paper. 
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Chapter Four: Application of the legal situation to the Demirkan case 
 
The following section argues that, legally speaking, there is no way that the CJEU can refuse 
the applicant the right to travel freely in the EU, based on the law in the case at hand 
explained in the first two sections of this paper. Of course, the CJEU does not exist in a 
vacuum and there are political implications that could result from a decision in favour of the 
applicant in this case. These political elements will be considered in the following chapter.  
 
This section argues that the standstill clause should be considered to be operation with 
regards to service recipients and thus prohibits new visa restrictions. Furthermore, this 
paper argues for a broad interpretation of the current EU-Turkey legal provisions, 
encompassing a wider range of rights, but even if the CJEU opts for a narrow reading, there 
is no way that economic rights can be restricted. There also cannot, as was purported by the 
Advocate General, be considered to be any obligation to specify the services you are 
planning to receive, so long as they are not marginal and ancillary. 
 
4.1 Is the standstill clause in operation? 
As laid out previously, the standstill clause, Article 41(1) AP has direct effect174 and prohibits 
the application of conditions for access to territory of a Member that are less favourable 
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than the conditions that were applicable on the date of entry into force of the Additional 
Protocol, namely 1 January 1973, as outlined in Soysal.175 
The law in Germany pertaining to Turkish nationals at the time in question was Paragraph 
5(1)1 of the Verordnung zur Durchführung des Ausländergesetzes (Regulation implementing 
the Law on Foreign nationals, henceforth DVAuslG.)176 The DVAuslG, enacted in 1965 and 
amended in 1972 stated that Turkish nationals were obliged to obtain a visa prior to entry 
only if they sought employment in Germany. There was no visa requirement at the time for 
stays for the purpose of a visit, as the applicant in Demirkan seeks. However, in 1980, the 
eleventh amendment to the DVAuslG brought in a general visa requirement for Turkish 
nationals, which Germany claims is in line with Paragraph 4(1) of the AufenthG177 and Article 
1(1) and Annex I to Regulation 539/2001.178 
This must be considered a new visa requirement, prohibited by Article 41(1) AP, as well as 
by Soysal.179 The requirement laid out in the AufenthG does clearly restrict the freedom to 
provide and receive services and is thus forbidden, even though the German government 
claims that it stems from a provision of EU law. As referred to in the first chapter and in 
175
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Bresciani,180 association agreements bear all the characteristics of primary law, including 
primacy.181 As such, in this case, Regulation 539/2001 can be considered to interfere with 
the rights laid out in a Treaty, and as such cannot be considered compatible with the 
scheme of EU external relations law relating to Turkey. 
Even if, as purported by the Verwaltungsgericht in its judgment of 22 October 2009, the 
standstill clause does not cover stays for the purpose of visiting, the applicant will still 
receive services, which are covered by the provisions of EU-Turkey law.182 As such, the 
standstill clause should be considered to be effective in this case, and that any new 
restrictions placed on the freedom of movement of Turkish citizens seeking to receive 
services are unlawful and in breach of Article 41(1) AP. 
4.2 EU-Turkey Relationship: Economic Goals Only? 
As laid out in Metalsa, the interpretation of provisions depends on the aim pursued by each 
provision in its particular context.183 This section will state that CJEU can grant the rights 
sought by Demirkan, even if the goals of the EU-Turkey Relationship have an “exclusively 
economic purpose.”184 Were one to read the goals of the EU-Turkey Relationship narrowly, 
as was done by Advocate General Cruz Villalon, as opposed to teleologically, one could 
argue this is the case. Indeed, Article 2(1) AA highlights the goal as the “promotion of 
180
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continuous and balanced strengthening of trade and economic relations between parties.” 
This could furthermore be argued by the fact that the key Treaties and Decisions of the 
relationship itself pre-date the shift from individuals being seen as economic to social 
beings185 within the EU. This chance can be considered to have begun in 1990186 and was 
implemented in 1992 by the Maastricht Treaty.187 
Nevertheless, the right that the applicant in Demirkan seeks cannot be considered to really 
relate to citizenship or social rights, which could perhaps on a literal reading be excluded 
from the scope of the AA. The right the applicant seeks, the passive freedom to provide 
services, is purely economic in nature, and settled EU case-law since 1984 through the Luisi 
and Carbone decision. It is considered as a necessary corollary for the freedom to provide 
services, and furthermore, Article 14 AA requires that the rights enjoyed by Turkish citizens 
are guided by the provisions on service provision in the current TFEU. If, as forwarded the 
Advocate General, equality where possible is not required as a result of the wording of 
‘guided by,’ there is the scope for a dangerous legal situation. 
Although, legally speaking, Turkish nationals are already second-class citizens within the EU, 
with no EU citizenship, no official status as workers, no general right of free movement or 
entry, not following the law closely could exacerbate an already undesirable tiered system 
185
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where Turkish citizens only enjoy a skeleton number of rights. It also threatens an important 
legal principle, legal certainty, as Turkish citizens seeking to move to the EU could not be 
sure of what rights the possess and which they do not, meaning that they may choose to 
move to the EU illegally or simply be dissuaded from going there due to a lack of certainty 
over what rights they have. This is certainly undesirable, as Turkey possesses sizeable 
economic power with millions of workers willing to take up roles within the EU. This would 
provide a powerful partner for the EU in terms of services and establishment, which in turn 
may help the EU resolve, to some extent, the current economic crisis within the Union. 
Furthermore, as in Abatay188 the rights should be conferred to Turkish citizens “so far as 
possible,”189 in the case of service providers, and that services should be given its normal 
meaning within the scope of EU law. Indeed, Peers states that the standstill clause should be 
considered to operate in the field of services. Furthermore, it would not be going beyond 
the requirement to extend the free movement provisions laid out in Abatay to also extend 
the scope of the standstill clause to the passive freedom to provide services,190 when 
considering a narrower reading of the AA and AP. 
4.3 EU-Turkey Relationship: The Road to Accession? 
This paper argues, however, that the legal scheme of the EU-Turkey relationship does 
encompass more rights than simply economic rights, and should be considered, under 
188
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certain articles to include social provisions as well. Indeed, the EU has in the past changed 
its mind concerning the scope of Association Agreements, as was the case in the EU-Swiss 
Association Agreement. The body of case law in that field will be considered during this 
section and applied to the case at hand, arguing that the AA and AP seek to lay out a 
broader scheme of provisions than one with purely economic purposes. 
As stated above, Advocate General Darmon posited in Demirel that the AA aimed to 
establish ever closer bonds between the Turkish people and the peoples brought together in 
the EEC, outlining the prospect of accession,191 as well as the fact that Phinnemore outlines 
the AA as currently the most far-reaching association agreement currently in force with a 
third country.192 This could be considered to show that the CJEU interpreted the agreement 
rather too narrowly in its Ziebell judgment, and that the EU-Turkey relationship goes deeper 
than simply an economic one. 
The AA, signed in 1963, outlines one of the goals of the Agreement itself as “recognising 
that the support given by the European Economic Community to the efforts of the Turkish 
people to improve their standard of living will facilitate the accession of Turkey to the 
Community at a later date.”193 To this end, instead of seeing the framework as simply one 
for economic purposes, the AA and following legislation can be considered something to 
achieve an end goal: the accession of Turkey to the EU. 
191
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To this end, it should be noted that the rights conferred upon Turkish nationals go beyond 
the purely economic. In Wählergrüppe Gemeinsam Zajedno/Birlikte,194 the CJEU stated that 
Article 10(1) Decision 1/80195 enjoyed direct effect, as:  
“a provision in a decision of the EEC-Turkey Association Council must be regarded as 
having direct effect when, regard being had to its wording and to the purpose and 
nature of the decision of which it forms part and of the agreement to which it relates, 
that provision contains a clear and precise obligation which is not subject, in its 
implementation or effects, to the adoption of any subsequent measure.”196 
 
This meant that the Austrian “denial of the right to stand as a candidate for election to a 
body representing and defending the interests of workers, such as the chambers of workers 
in Austria,”197 could not be justified by the nature of the chamber of workers nor by the fact 
that the position could involve the exercise of public powers. Whilst it should be noted that 
such a right is closely allied to economic rights, it also involves political rights, something 
which, according to Article 22(1) of the TFEU is restricted to ‘citizens of the Union.’ In this 
regard, one could consider that Decision 1/80 does confer what could be referred to as 
‘citizenship’ rights, especially given the potentially broad scope of Article 10(1) Decision 
1/80. 
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In Gürol,198 the CJEU determined that Article 9(1) of Decision 1/80199 guarantees non-
discriminatory access to education grants, even when a Turkish national is pursuing 
education back in Turkey.200 This could also be considered to extend the scope of the EU-
Turkey relationship beyond being purely economic in nature, as purported by A-G Cruz 
Villalon in Demirkan, as well as by the CJEUin Ziebell,201 although again, this right does have 
an economic element to it. Moreover, as referred to in Chapter 2, Carrera and Wiesbrock 
state that citizenship rights are not totally restricted to EU citizens.202 This includes the right 
to non-discrimination and equal treatment, which even extends to third-country nationals 
who lack a formal association agreement with the EU. 
 
As purported above, bearing a broad reading in mind, the CJEU should consider the wider 
aims and intention of the parties to this Agreement. To this end, the AECS shall be looked at, 
considering the fact that they are both association agreements, and that the CJEU has 
interpreted them both rather narrowly in the past. The CJEU read the provisions of the AECS 
very narrowly, as stated in the previous chapter203 further stating that the rules of the 
internal market could not simply be applied by analogy.204  
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However, the Court rather drastically changed its tack in the Graf case.205 It stated that “it is 
important to note that the [AECS] falls within the more general context of relations between 
the European Union and the Swiss Confederation.”206 In itself, this is not controversial: 
Association Agreements do constitute a crucial part of the EU legal order.207 Despite this, its 
extension of the goals was something new, stating although Switzerland did not opt to 
participate in the EEA or internal market, “it is nevertheless linked to the Union by 
numerous agreements covering a wide range of areas and prescribing rights and specific 
obligations, analogous, in some respects, to those laid down by the Treaty.”208 
This is an interpretation which can, and should, be applied to the position of Turkey. The AA 
itself in the preamble lays out the potential for accession, and the general scheme and the 
aims of the association, as was the case in Graf, should be borne in mind in a more 
teleological reading of the Agreement. As such, not only are economic rights conferred by 
the current scheme of EU-Turkey law, but so should a number of more social rights due to 
its analogous nature, in parts, to the European Union legal order. 
205
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4.4 Unspecified services 
A-G Cruz Villalon in Demirkan suggested that as the services received were unspecified, they 
could not fall within the scope of the four freedoms.209 As was referred to in the previous 
chapter, this is firstly irrelevant as tourists fall under the scope of being a service recipient in 
paragraph 10 of Luisi and Carbone. Secondly, there is no specific requirement to disclose the 
services you will be receiving, as long as you actually receive them and they are not marginal 
or ancillary. 
 
It should be noted that rights conferred by the EU cannot really be abused,210 but rather 
that one is seeking to use the rights conferred upon them in the most effective manner, as 
one would in a single market. In Centros, taking the route of least available resistance could 
not be considered an abuse of, in this case, the freedom of establishment.211 In Demirkan, 
there cannot be an abuse of the passive freedom to provide services, as purported by A-G 
Cruz Vilallon, even though the primary purpose of the trip is to see family and that the 
passive freedom to provide services simply used as a reason behind the trip. One can draw 
analogies between services and establishment within the scope of EU law as they are very 
similar; indeed, Jóhannsdóttir states that “close links between the two [are] so close, in fact, 
that sometimes it can be hard to distinguish between them.”212 Within the sphere of EU 
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law, the two fields could be considered almost analogous: indeed, the section in the TFEU 
on the freedom to provide services even refers back to the freedom of establishment.213 
As was stated in Abatay,214 the provisions of EU law should be applied as far as possible to 
the situation of Turkish nationals. As was stated previously in this chapter, it would be highly 
undesirable, as well as unfair, to create a two-tiered system of rights in the field of services. 
One thus cannot create, as sought by A-G Cruz Villalon, to almost create a category of 
‘unspecified’ services that only applies to Turkish nationals seeking to exercise their rights 
and not EU citizens. 
One must therefore consider what applies to EU citizens, and then by extrapolation and 
under the logic forwarded in Abatay, bestow them upon Turkish citizens in as similar way as 
possible. Perhaps the leading case of defining service provision in Steymann,215 that for 
something to be considered as a service, it cannot be marginal and ancillary.216 Whilst this 
should be for the national court to determine, under the current scheme of EU law, it seems 
unlikely that if the applicant is visiting for a couple of months the services received would be 
marginal and ancillary. 
213
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4.5 Conclusion 
As forwarded by the Polish Institute for International Affairs, the CJEU cannot really decide 
against the applicant in this case when looking at the letter of the law,217 regardless of how 
widely it interprets the framework of law. This would open the door for Turkish nationals to 
move freely for 3 months within the EU. Idriz also states that as well as opening the door for 
tourism, it would mean that Turkish nationals could not be discriminated against for the 
cost of entry for museums, or educational institutions under Article 9 AA.218  
However, it must be noted that associated with a decision in favour of the applicant in 
Demirkan would entail a number of other political, historical and generally non-legal 
considerations which will be looked at in the following chapter. 
217
 Anadolu Agency, ‘EU may lift visa requirements for all Turkish citizens soon’ Anadolu Agency (Ankara, 25 
December 2012). 
218
 Idriz, Supra, no. 125, p. 22. 
 
53 
 
Chapter Five: Political elements in the EU-Turkey Relationship 
As stated at the start of Chapter 4, the CJEU does not exist in a vacuum, and of course, 
political elements will play a role in the decision given the potentially enormous 
ramifications of a decision in favour of the applicant in Demirkan. This chapter aims to give 
an overview of some of the political issues in the background. Particularly of interest are the 
peaceful protests which turned into rioting after a very heavy-handed response by the 
Turkish government. This does little to bridge the divide between Turkey and the EU, and 
indeed to some may indicate that there are irreconcilable differences in the styles of 
governance. 
 
5.1 A numbers game and the loss of visa control 
Perhaps the first consideration is simply what could happen if Turkey is given visa-free travel 
in line with Article 6(1) of Directive 2004/38.  
 
In terms of size, Turkey has a population of 73.64 million,219 and furthermore, “if Turkey 
ever joins [the EU], it is likely on present demographic trends to become the most populous 
member by 2020.”220 This could be considered to set it apart from other countries which 
have recently surpassed its rights in terms of visa entry. Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro 
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and Serbia,221 all of which have recently had visa requirements lifted, have a total 
population of 13.2 million.222 The 28th Member State, Croatia, has a population of 4.4 
million.223 
 
One can simply reduce this situation to somewhat of a numbers game. Smaller countries like 
those who have had their visa requirements recently lifted do not really present what 
Member States might consider a threat of a sizeable population influx. However, visa 
requirements do go to the core of what Member States consider the heart of their 
sovereignty,224 and with it being such a controversial issue, one could ponder whether it is 
really the place of the CJEU to essentially lift the visa requirements upon Turkish citizens. 
 
Just how fearful Member States are of massive influxes of Eastern Europeans can be 
demonstrated by concerns over the end of the transitional arrangements relating to 
Bulgaria and Romania. Segments of the British press feared ‘unlimited numbers’ entering 
the UK having a ‘disastrous’ effect on the job market and housing,225 with concerns over 
government secrecy concerning the influx,226 whilst in Germany, Spiegel voiced similar 
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concerns.227 Given the widespread fears relating to removing restrictions on 29 million 
people228, opening the door to Turkey, with a population of nearly two and a half times the 
size could be very unpopular, especially if done by the CJEU. 
 
To this end, the EU paved the way for visa-free travel for Turkish citizens following an 
announcement by Cecilia Malmström in September 2011,229 and the Polish Institute for 
International Affairs foresees that as a result of the Demirkan case, visa requirements would 
have to be lifted by mid-2013.230 This has come in the form of Roadmap 16929/12, seeking 
to liberalise the visa process. However, to date, Turkey has been rather unhappy with the 
progress made; with EU Minister Egemen Bağış stating that even non-candidate (including 
Russia, which has double the population size of Turkey) countries are negotiating visa-free 
travel,231 and Economy Minister Zafer Çağlayan describing the restrictions on travel, 
especially with regards to Turkish businessmen, a violation of human rights.232 It is clear 
from the tension on both sides that a well-considered compromise must be arrived at 
sooner rather than later, and perhaps why a CJEU decision may not be the EU’s preferred 
method of opening the door. 
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5.2 Human Rights 
Another issue held up as halting the accession, and indeed the visa liberation, process is 
Turkey’s human rights record. This could be considered to include a number of other 
contested issues, such as the occupation of North Cyprus and the ongoing struggle with the 
PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party.) Turkey was a founding member of the Council of Europe in 
1949, but since this has had more cases brought against it than any other contracting party 
by the European Court of Human Rights.233 
The unfortunate statistic also holds true for the most cases brought against it concerning 
Article 3 ECHR, the prohibition of torture. This has been particularly pronounced with 
regards to suspected PKK members.234 The refusal of Turkey to capitulate to the PKK is 
considered as a “primitive form of racism,”235 as is its failure to recognise the Kurds as a 
separate democratic entity.236 This “idealistic view of the Kurdish awakening has real effects 
in…relations between…[the EU] and the so-called ‘non-democratic Turks.”237 It should be 
noted that such a viewpoint perhaps remains the prerogative of those in an ivory tower: 
whilst perhaps alleged PKK members have been overly harshly dealt with, the PKK is on the 
list of Foreign Terrorist Organisations produced by the US Department of State,238 other EU 
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Member States have also breached human rights when faced with supposed terrorist 
threats.239  
 
The requirement of Turkey’s human rights record improving is an important bargaining tool, 
and one which the EU would loathe to lose. However, despite the ongoing war with the PKK 
appearing to draw to a close, it could have been suggested that this was a genuine step in 
the right direction for human rights in Turkey. However, one can only ponder the 
implications of Turkey’s heavy-handed approach to the recent Taksim Square rioting.240  
 
5.3 Visa-free travel as a bargaining chip 
Visa-free travel remains an important bargaining chip for the EU in relations with Turkey: 
indeed, the EU has insisted that Turkey must sign a re-admission agreement relating to all 
illegal immigrants entering the EU through Turkey.241 Were Turkey to gain visa-free travel 
through a CJEU decision, Turkey would gain what it desired without being forced to sign an 
agreement which, from a neutral observer’s perspective, cannot be seen to benefit it. 
Around 80% of migrants to the EU currently come through Greece,242 although most of 
these migrants “set off from Turkey in tiny boats and wash up on one of Greece’s many 
islands.”243 This would simply shift the burden onto Turkey, as it is the natural point of 
access for migrants from Asia and Africa. One can understand Turkey’s unwillingness to be 
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responsible for hundreds of thousands of migrants a year in return for something a number 
of its neighbours have already been granted, and it could, justly feel it is entitled to. 
 
5.4 Demographics and geography 
Another, perhaps more simple, issue is demographics and geography of Turkey itself. In 
terms of religion, whilst a secular state,244 Turkey has a Muslim population of around 
98%.245 Europe, as a whole, has a Muslim population of around 5%,246 and to many who 
have had little contact with Muslims, this presents a concerning proposition,247 with Turkey 
having a “different culture, different approach [and] a different way of life.”248  
 
Turkey’s geographical position, with around 5% of its land in Europe, also has led to concern 
amongst politicians, with former French President and Head of the EU’s Constitutional 
Convention Valery Giscard d’Estaing stating that “its capital is not in Europe, 95 percent of 
its population live outside Europe, it is not a European country,”249 and that opening the 
doors to it would result in other Middle Eastern and North African states demanding to 
join.250 Former President of Bavaria Edmund Stoiber also stated that “Europe cannot end on 
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the Turkish-Iraqi border,”251 with many more EU officials expressing doubts more 
privately.252 
 
5.5 Greek-Turkish relations 
As alluded to in Chapter 5.2, the chequered history between Greece and Turkey (prior to 
1922, the Ottoman Empire) is another issue lurking in the background of this decision. The 
two countries first clashed in the Greek War of Independence in 1821, which resulted in a 
number of massacres,253 finally leading to the recognition of the Greek state in 1830.254 The 
countries have since fought three wars, as well as carrying out a mass enforced population 
exchange255 in 1923.256 Even today, only 25% of Greeks believe Turkey has a place in the EU, 
and less than 20% of Greek-Cypriots.257 
 
Northern Cyprus is perhaps the ongoing divisive issue between the two states, as well as 
with regards to Turkish EU membership. The EU feels that Turkey is unlawfully occupying a 
(part of a) Member State,258 as well as unlawful removal of persons from their property.259 
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The EU sees the occupation as a violation of the sovereignty in Cyprus, and to this end has 
refused to acknowledge North Cyprus as a State.260 This could be considered to exacerbate 
the already sour relations between Greece and Turkey, which plays a sizeable role in the 
ongoing conflict.261 Both the Republic of Cyprus and Greece hold a veto in the EU, and have 
used this to “veto any easing of restrictions on the north.”262 
Whilst the animosity from the past has to some extent subsided,263 a number of key issues 
still remain, especially Northern Cyprus: the Greek President in 2009 stated that “as long as 
Ankara behaves as an occupying force in Cyprus, we cannot support the Turkish EU 
membership processes.”264 However, the Greek-Cypriots were the ones to refuse a UN-
backed re-unification plan, so it is rather difficult to place the blame squarely in Turkey for 
the continued problems, especially when it has acknowledged the compensation it must pay 
for the breach of the right to property265 could pave the way for a settlement for a united 
Cyprus.266 
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5.6 2013: A tough year for Turkey 
In June 2013, there was mass protesting in Istanbul following the decision to re-develop one 
of the few remaining parks in Istanbul into a shopping centre. The protest was initially a 
peaceful demonstration, but the Turkish police responded in a particularly heavy-handed 
manner. This caused a huge number of injuries and even deaths, all of which have been 
broadcast worldwide by the media. One could justly wonder whether the EU would want to 
grant visa-free travel to a country that responds to protests in such a matter, and highlights 
the difference in politics and governance between the EU and Turkey. Indeed, the EU and 
Member States unwilling to remove visa restrictions might be content to bend the law in 
this scenario to fit more with their political agendas. 
 
However, the ramifications of this could be even greater for Turkey: “following Turkey’s own 
recent anti-government protests, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s Islamic-rooted 
government will have been viewing events in Egypt [the coup d’etat in July 2013] with 
concern.”267 A military coup in Turkey, something which has happened before in 1960, 1980 
and 1997, would certainly tarnish relations with the EU. Even if this does not happen, the 
instability that would come from a serious level of unrest, as was the case in Egypt,268 could 
lead to widespread political migration. The EU would be a likely destination if visa controls 
are lifted. For those wary of migration from Turkey, this presents a concerning scenario. 
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 The picture below highlights how the police response has been seen in the media, with the 
police using CS gas on what appears to be a smartly-dressed passer-by. This reaction has 
brought widespread condemnation of the government response, with President Erdoğan 
suffering a large backlash.269 With Turkey needing to be on its best behaviour bearing the 
human rights issues it has had in the past, one only need wonder what damage this 
response will do to Turkey’s pleas for visa-free travel. As stated above, such a response not 
only destroys the notion that Turkey’s human rights record is improving, but also the notion 
that Turkey and the EU share a similar mindset. 
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Chapter Six: Conclusion 
From the arguments raised above, it is apparent that the CJEU cannot rightfully refuse 
Turkish citizens the right to visa-free travel, when considered in the light of the large body of 
law governing the EU-Turkish relationship. This should ultimately be the decision reached by 
the CJEU, considering the letter of the law, free from other political considerations which 
should not form part of its decision-making process.  
 
However, there are a number of ‘elephants in the room’ that the Court will find rather 
difficult to ignore. The fear that such a decision would open the doors to what politicians 
claim would be a mass influx of Turkish service recipients is a very powerful thing. If the 
CJEU does bend the law to a selective reading of the EU-Turkey provisions, the judiciary of 
the EU could be considered to be driven by improper factors. This cannot really be in 
accordance with the CJEU’s mandate, even bearing in mind the vague separation of powers 
that exists in the EU: the CJEU is only to rule on legal matters, not political ones, as outlined 
in Article 19(3) TEU. 
 
 Concerns of a mass influx along with the current political events in Turkey constitute fears 
at the forefront of many politicians’ minds; this merely compounds the political interest in 
the forthcoming CJEU judgment. Additionally, there is also the importance to the EU of visa-
free travel in accession negotiations, as well as the military conflict and political history 
between Greece and Turkey. The lethal force used in response to the peaceful protests does 
little to bridge the divide between the EU and Turkey culturally or politically. These 
64 
considerations highlight just how political CJEU decision making can be, especially when 
faced with the lifting of visa controls, which would be in most circumstances, a political 
decision at a parliamentary level. These factors further emphasises how the CJEU, a judicial 
body, is being thrust into the political arena, and how forcing such a body to take what is a 
huge decision may not result in the most effective outcome for all parties. Indeed, were the 
CJEU to rule in favour of the applicant and grant visa-free travel, it would usurp the recent 
careful negotiations between Turkey and the EU. 
Amongst the political arguments, there is the belief that the CJEU, in interpreting EU law 
broadly, is acting to fill in areas of the law where the legislation’s intentions were never 
clearly established. This point is made by Advocate General Cruz Villalon in his Opinion on 
the Demirkan case: that “it cannot be established with absolute certainty what the 
Contracting Parties understood under the concept of ‘freedom to provide services’ at the 
time the Additional Protocol was concluded.”270 
The fact that the CJEU is being asked to rule on these matters forces it into taking what must 
be considered as a political decision, however much the Court seeks to work within the 
confines and framework of the law. Whichever way the judgment goes, the ruling will be 
significant. Either they will rule in favour of the applicant and face calls that they have 
extended the legislation beyond where it was intended to go, or rule in favour of Germany, 
270
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and be criticised for abdicating from their legal duty to apply the law to the facts of a case 
before them. 
Viewed objectively, there can only be a decision in favour of the applicant, and if EU law in 
this field is to develop in a rational manner in the future, this is the only appropriate 
conclusion to reach. 
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